Press

Gauging Corruption in a Country via Monitoring Parking Violations

April 13, 2012
Mostly Economics Blog, by Amol Agrawal
Blog Posts
Document/Website
ParkingTicket MostlyEconomics20120413.pdf

Social Scientists Develop Profile To Spot Likely Tax EvadersNational Public Radio
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Economist Raymond Fisman to Join BU FacultyBoston University
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Corruption and Revolt – Does tolerating graft undermine national security?The New Yorker
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India’s Collective Action TroubleLiveMint
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Multas, cultura e corrupçãoFolha De S. Paulo
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Corrupcion: Fenomeno Cultural Pero Superable en el Corto PlazoEl Sol de Mexico
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Objective Validation of Subjective Corruption Perceptions?GAB - The Global AnticorruptionBlog
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Combate à corrupção no Brasil: é possível?Gazeta do Povo: Dinheiro Publico
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Economic Gangsters
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Corruption, Norms and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking TicketsPublished PaperOtherPolitical Economy and Conflict2007
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